


CABO VERDE NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN 2023-2025



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RECORD OF REVISIONS

Revision Nº	Date
Original issue	December 2022

ABBREVIATIONS

AAC Agência de Aviação Civil (Civil Aviation Authority)

AFI-RASG AFI regional aviation safety group
AMO Approved Maintenance Organizations

ANS Air Navigation Services

APIRG AFI Planning and Implementation Regional Group

ATO Approved Training Organizations

ATS Air Traffic Service

BAGAIA Banjul Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency

BAGASOO Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organization

CAP Corrective Action Plan
CE Critical element

CFIT Controlled flight into terrain

CICTT CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CMA Continuous monitoring approach

El Effective implementation
GASP Global Aviation Safety Plan

G-HRC Global High-risk categories of occurrences ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IPIAAM Instituto de Prevenção e Investigação de Acidentes Aeronáuticos e Marítimos

iSTARS integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System

LOC-I Lost of Control In-flight
NASP National Aviation Safety Plan

OLF ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework

PQ ICAO Protocol Question PPQ Priority Protocol Question

RAIO Regional accident and incident investigation organization

RASG
RASP
Regional Aviation Safety Group
Regional Aviation Safety Plan
Remotely Pilot Aircraft System

SDCPS Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems

SEI Safety enhancement initiatives
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SPI Safety Performance Indicator
SSP State Safety Programme

SSPIA State safety programme Implementation Assessment

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme ICAO Western and Central African Office

1. **SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1 Overview of the NASP

Cabo Verde is committed to enhancing aviation safety and to the resourcing of supporting activities. The purpose of this National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe, resilient and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of Cabo Verde and its industries. The NASP promotes the effective implementation of Cabo Verde safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between Cabo Verde and other States, regions and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as the strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

The NASP of Cabo Verde is in alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) *Global Aviation Safety Plan* (GASP, Doc 10004)].

1.2 Structure of the NASP

This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the national level, for a period of three years. It comprises six sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the NASP, Cabo Verde strategic direction for the management of aviation safety, the national operational safety risks identified for the 2023-2025 NASP, organizational challenges addressed in the NASP, and a description of how the implementation of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) listed in the NASP is going to be monitored.

1.3 Relationship between the NASP and the State Safety Programme (SSP)

This NASP addresses operational safety risks presented in the ICAO GASP, in the absence of mature safety data analysis aspects, as described in the ICAO State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA), in Cabo Verde. Initiatives listed in this NASP address organizational challenges and aim to enhance organizational capabilities related to effective safety oversight.

1.4 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring

The Agência de Aviação Civil (AAC) is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with Instituto de Prevenção e Investigação de Acidentes Aeronáuticos e Marítimos (IPIAAM) and with the national aviation industry. The NASP was developed in consultation with national operators and other key aviation stakeholders, and in alignment with the 2023-2025 edition of the GASP.

1.5 National safety issues, goals and targets

The NASP addresses the following national safety issues, which in line with the GASP focus on two aspects of safety planning that ICAO considers to be of concern to the international aviation community, identified on the basis of safety data collected from proactive and reactive activities: **Organizational challenges** and **Operational safety risks**.

Organizational challenges are systemic issues, which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include entities in a State, such as the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and service providers, such as aircraft operators, Air Traffic Service (ATS) providers, approved

aviation

training organizations, approved maintenance organizations, operators of aerodromes, etc. Organizations should identify hazards

- 1) Continuous improvement and implementation of an effective safety oversight system;
- 2) Implementation of Cabo Verde State Safety Program (SSP);

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (for example, operation of an aircraft, airports or provision of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out, are taken into consideration to identify performance limitations and hazards. The GASP identifies a series of Global High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (G-HRCs) that need to be addressed to mitigate the risk of fatalities. These G-HRCs were selected based on actual fatalities, high fatality risk per

accident or the number of accidents and incidents. The NASP addresses the G-HRC1 and other national safety risks:

1) Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity

and mitigate the associated risks to manage safety. The NASP identifies two organizational challenges:

- 2) Seasonal Haze
- 3) Terrain infringing the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS);
- 4) Controlled flight into terrain (G-HRC)
- 5) Loss of control in-flight (G-HRC)
- 6) Mid-air collision (G-HRC);
- 7) Runway excursion (G-HRC); and
- 8) Runway incursion (G-HRC).

To address the issues listed above and enhance aviation safety at the national level, the 2023-2025 NASP contains the following goals and targets:

Goal	Target
Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks	1.1 Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate. 1.2 Decrease the number of safety occurrences associated with Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity. 1.3 Increase the capability of aerodromes to operate under seasonal haze
2. Strengthen the safety oversight capabilities	2.1 By 2025, reach an Effective Implementation (EI) of the Critical Elements (CEs) of the Cabo Verde safety oversight system score of 85%.

¹ It should be noted that while the G-HRCs are not significant concerns in Cabo Verde, due to the state operational context and low probability of occurrence (in some cases they have never occurred, as for the case of mid-air collision), in line with the GASP and due to the high fatality risk per accident and statistics worldwide, they were included in the NASP.

3. Implement an effective State safety program.	3.1 By 2024 implement the foundation of an SSP 3.2 By 2023, publish a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP). 3.3 Cabo Verde to work towards an effective SSP as follows: a) By 2025 – Present² b) By 2028 – Present and effective
4. Increase collaboration at the regional level to enhance safety.	4.1 By 2023, Cabo Verde to continue to offer assistance to States that do not expect to meet GASP Goal 2 and to play a major part in the regional safety oversight mechanism 4.2 By 2025, contribute information on operational safety risks, including SSP Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), and emerging issues, to the AFI Regional Aviation Safety Group (AFI-RASG) and Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organization (BAGASOO)
5.Promote the use of industry programmes and safety information sharing networks.	5.1 Increase trend in industry's contribution in safety information sharing networks to States and regions to assist in the development of NASPs and RASPs.
6. Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations	6.1 By 2025, Cabo Verde to continue with the implementation of air navigation and aerodrome infrastructure that meet relevant ICAO Standards

Table 1: Cabo Verde goals and targets

1.6 Operational Context

There are seven aerodromes in Cabo Verde, including four certified international aerodromes, which one is CAT 4E and the other three CAT 4D. The airspace of Cabo Verde is classified into Class A, C and G. There were 96.725 movements³ in Cabo Verde over the period of 2018 to 2021. There are currently two Air Operator Certificates (AOCs) issued by Cabo Verde, and of those there is one issued operator conducting international commercial air transport operations and one operator which operate domestic commercial air transport operations.

Common hazards and safety deficiencies in Cabo Verde include:

- 1) Meteorology: Seasonal Haze
- 2) Topography: Terrain infringing the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS);
- 3) Environmental: Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity

 $^{^2}$ The terms "present" and "present and effective" are based on the maturity levels established in the ICAO SSP Implementation Assessment (SSPIA).

³ Source: https://www.aac.cv/dash

2. SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF CABO VERDE'S NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

The NASP is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of Cabo Verde for the management of aviation safety for a period of three years (2023 to 2025). This plan lists national safety issues, sets national safety goals and targets, and presents a series of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals.

The NASP has been developed using the safety goals and targets and High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (HRCs) from the GASP (www.icao.int/gasp). The SEIs listed in the NASP support the improvement of safety at the wider regional and international levels

3. SECTION 3. CABO VERDE'S STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY

The NASP presents the SEIs that were developed based on the Organizational Challenges (ORG) and Operational Safety Risks (OPS) Roadmaps, as presented in the ICAO *Global Aviation Safety Roadmap* (Doc 10161), as well as other specific issues. This plan is developed and maintained by the Civil Aviation Authority, in coordination with key aviation stakeholders and is updated at least every three years.

The NASP includes the following national safety goals and targets, for the management of aviation safety, as well as a series of indicators to monitor the progress made towards their achievement. They are tied to the goals, targets and indicators listed in the GASP and include additional national safety goals, targets and indicators.

Goal	Target	Indicators	Link to GASP and RASP
Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks	 1.1 Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate. 1.2 Decrease the number of safety occurrences associated with Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity. 1.3 Increase the capability of aerodromes to operate under seasonal haze 	 Number of accidents Number of fatal accidents Percentage of occurrences related to High-Risk Categories (HRCs). Number of safety occurrences associated with Presence of wildlife Number of flights affected (cancelled, deviated, go-around etc) by the seasonal haze. 	This goal is directly linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.1 of the GASP.
2. Strengthen the safety oversight capabilities	2.1 By 2025, reach an Effective Implementation (EI) of the Critical Elements (CEs) of the Cabo Verde safety oversight system score of 85%.	Percentage of EI Percentage of PPQ implemented Percentage of required Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.1 of the GASP.
3. Implement an effective State safety program.	3.1 By 2023 implement the foundation of an SSP 3.2 By 2023, publish a national aviation safety plan (NASP). 3.3 Cabo Verde to work towards	Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP	This goal is directly linked to Goal 3 and Target 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the GASP.

	an effective SSP as follows: a) By 2025 –Present ⁴ b) By 2028 – Present and effective	foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable Service Providers who have implemented an SMS. Percentage of SSP PQ with Present level of maturity achieved Percentage of SSP PQ with Present and effective level of maturity achieved	
4. Increase collaboration at the regional level to enhance safety.	4.1 By 2023, Cabo Verde to continue to offer assistance to States that do not expect to meet GASP Goal 2 and to play a major part in the regional safety oversight mechanism 4.2 By 2025, to contribute with information on operational safety risks, including SSP Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), and emerging issues, to the AFI Regional Aviation Safety Group (AFI-RASG) and Banjul Accord Group Aviation Safety Oversight Organization (BAGASOO)	NASP submitted to ICAO Western and Central African (WACAF) Number of States requiring assistance Number of States that received assistance Register to the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues Number of Reports/surveys on safety risks shared with RASG-AFI and BAGASOO Number of SSP SPIs shared with RASG-AFI and BAGASOO	This goal is directly linked to Goal 4 and Target 4.1 and 4.3 of the GASP.
5.Promote the use of industry programmes and safety information sharing networks.	5.1 Increase trend in industry's contribution in safety information sharing networks to States and regions to assist in the development of NASPs and RASPs.	Number of service providers using globally harmonized metrics for their SPIs Percentage of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO-recognized industry assessment programmes Number of service providers contributing to an SDCPS or a safety information sharing network	This goal is directly linked to Goal 5 and Target 5.1 of the GASP.
6. Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations	6.1 By 2025, Cabo Verde to continue with the implementation of air navigation and aerodrome infrastructure that meet relevant ICAO Standards	 Number or percentage of infrastructure-related air navigation deficiencies by State, against the regional air navigation plans Number or percentage implemented infrastructure-related PQs linked to the basic building blocks 	This goal is directly linked to Goal 6 and Target 6.1 of the GASP.

Table 2: Cabo Verde safety goals, targets and indicators

The SEIs in this plan are implemented through Cabo Verde's existing safety oversight capabilities and the service providers' SMS. SEIs derived from the ICAO *Global Aviation Safety Roadmap* (Doc 10161) were identified to achieve the national safety goals presented in the NASP. Some of the national SEIs are linked to overarching SEIs at the regional and

 $^{^4}$ The terms "present" and "present and effective" are based on the maturity levels established in the ICAO SSP Implementation Assessment (SSPIA).

international levels and help to enhance aviation safety globally. The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

The NASP also addresses emerging issues. Emerging issues include concepts of operations, technologies, public policies, business models or ideas that might impact safety in the future, for which insufficient data exists to complete typical data-driven analysis. Due to the lack of data, emerging issues cannot automatically be considered as operational safety risks. It is important to remain vigilant on emerging issues to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, collect relevant data and proactively develop mitigations to address any associated risks. The NASP addresses the following emerging issues for further analysis:

- 1) small drones operating in the vicinity of aerodromes
- 2) Laser Strikes
- 3) Operations of RPAS and UAS

4. SECTION 4. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

The NASP includes SEIs that address national operational safety risks, derived from lessons learned from occurrences and from a data-driven approach. These SEI may include actions such as: rule-making; policy development; targeted safety oversight activities; safety data analysis; and safety promotion. Separate sections are provided to address commercial air transport and general aviation to make the information more accessible to stakeholders.

Cabo Verde publishes an Annual Safety Report, available on the AAC website www.aac.cv. The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in Cabo Verde, and those for aircraft registered in Cabo Verde involved in commercial air transport and aircraft involved in general aviation, is shown in the tables below.

Year	Fatal accidents	Non-fatal accidents	Serious incidents						
Commercial air transport of	occurrences in Cabo Verde								
2018-2021	0	0 0							
2022	0	0	0						
General aviation aircraft occurrences in Cabo Verde									
2018-2021	0	0	1						
2022	0	0	0						
Year	Fatal accidents	Non-fatal accidents	Serious incidents						
Occurrences involving cor	nmercial air transport aircra	t registered in Cabo Verde							
2018-2021	0	0	2						
2022	0	0	0						
Occurrences involving general aviation aircraft registered in Cabo Verde									
2018-2021	0	0	0						
2022	0	0 0							

Table 3: summary of accidents and serious incidents

The following 8 high-risk categories of occurrences in the Cabo Verde context were considered of the utmost priority because of the number of fatalities and risk of fatalities associated with such occurrences. They were identified based on analyses from mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past 5 years, the SSP and on the operational safety risks described in the GASP.

The following HRCs are identified in the 2023-2025 of the GASP as Global High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (G-HRCs) that need to be addressed to mitigate the risk of fatalities and were selected based on actual fatalities, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents information collected at the global level:

- 1) Controlled flight into terrain;
- 2) Loss of control in-flight
- 3) Mid-air collision;
- 4) Runway excursion; and
- 5) Runway incursion

In addition to the HRCs listed above, the following national operational safety risks have been identified:

- 6) Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity: Air Operators reported occurrences involving Bird Strikes, Reject Take-off and Go-around due to the presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity;
- 7) Seasonal Haze: Air Operators reported occurrences resulting from the haze, such as flights cancellations, flight delay and flight diversion;
- 8) Terrain infringing the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS): operational restrictions in some aerodromes.

The aviation occurrence categories from the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) were used to assess risk categories in the process of determining national operational safety risks. The CICTT Taxonomy is found on the ICAO website at https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Pages/Taxonomy.aspx.

To address the national operational safety risks listed above, Cabo Verde identified the following contributing factors leading to HRCs and AAC, IPIAAM, service providers will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO OPS Roadmap, contained in the ICAO *Global Aviation Safety Roadmap* (Doc 10161):

HRC 1: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

- 1) Flight in adverse environmental conditions
- 2) Approach design and documentation
- 3) Phraseology used (standard vs non-standard)
- 4) Pilot fatigue and disorientation

HRC 2: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)

- 1) Distraction
- 2) Adverse weather
- 3) Complacency
- 4) Inadequate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for effective flight management
- 5) Insufficient height above terrain for recovery
- 6) Lack of awareness of or competence in procedures for recovery from unusual aircraft attitudes
- 7) Inappropriate flight control inputs in response to a sudden awareness of an abnormal bank angle

HRC 3: Mid-Air Collision (MAC)

- 1) Traffic conditions traffic density, complexity, mixture of aircraft types and capabilities, etc.
- 2) ATC performance related to workload, competence, teamwork, procedures, commitment, etc., as well as the influence of Air Navigation Services Providers' (ANSP) safety management
- 3) Flight crew training and corporate culture with workload, competence, teamwork, procedures, commitment etc., and the influence of aircraft operator's safety management
- 4) ATC systems flight data processing, communication, Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), etc., as well as the

interaction with the human operators and the aircraft systems, and the procurement policy of the ANSP

- 5) Aircraft equipment autopilots, transponders and Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), but also aircraft performance (e.g. rate-of-climb) and their physical size
- 6) Navigation infrastructure both coverage and quality
- 7) Surveillance both coverage and quality
- 8) Flight plan processing efficiency and reliability of flight plan submission, approval and distribution
- Airspace complexity of airspace design, route layout, extent of controlled or uncontrolled airspace, proximity of military operational or training areas, etc.
- 10) Flight in adverse environmental conditions that may influence conflict management and collision avoidance

HRC 4: Runway Excursion (RE)

- 1) Ineffective SOPs
- 2) Failure to adhere to the appropriate SOPs
- 3) Long/floated/bounced/firm/off-centre/crabbed landing
- 4) Inadequate approach procedures design
- 5) Inadequate regulatory oversight

HRC 5: Runway Incursion (RI)

- 1) Operations in low visibility conditions
- 2) Complex or inadequate aerodrome design
- 3) Complexity of traffic (multiple simultaneous line-ups)
- 4) Conditional clearances
- 5) Simultaneous use of intersecting runways
- 6) Late issue of or late changes to departure clearances
- 7) Phraseology use (e.g. non-standard vs. standard, call-sign confusion)
- 8) Concurrent use of more than one language for ATC communications
- 9) English language competence despite the introduction by ICAO of a system of validating competence in aviation English
- 10) Inadequate manoeuvring area driver training and assessment programme

HRC 6: Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity

- 1) Aerodrome located close to habitational areas and birds natural habitat
- 2) Animals grazing (Cow, goat, dog) near the aerodromes
- 3) garbage around aerodromes
- 4) lack of equipment's and/or qualified personnel to manage wildlife

HRC 7: Seasonal Haze

1) Natural event

HRC 8: Terrain infringing the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS)

1) Natural condition

The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

5. SECTION 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

In addition to the national operational safety risks listed in the NASP, Cabo Verde has identified organizational challenges and a series of SEIs, selected for the NASP, to address them. These are given priority in the NASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening Cabo Verde's safety oversight capabilities and the management of aviation safety at the national level.

The eight Critical Elements (CEs)of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. Cabo Verde is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs, as part of its overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize Cabo Verde's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Critical elements of a State's safety oversight system

The latest ICAO activities⁵, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of Cabo Verde's safety oversight system, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted in the following scores:

Overall El score							
	82.43%						
	El score by CE						
CE-1	CE-2	CE-3	CE-4	CE-5	CE-6	CE-7	CE-8
89.29%	83.1%	85.19%	75%	84.69%	87.74%	74.73%	69.44%

⁵ A safety oversight audit of the civil aviation system of Cabo Verde was conducted from 14 to 23 September 2009 under the USOAP CSA and an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM) was conducted from 5 to 12 June 2018.

El score by audit area ⁶							
LEG ORG PEL OPS AIR AIG ANS AGA							AGA
95.24%	100%	82.61%	90.82%	96.59%	56.34%	67.92%	90.83%

Table 4: Cabo Verde El Score 2018

The following organizational challenges in the Cabo Verde context were considered of the utmost priority because they impact the effectiveness of safety risk controls. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past years, the SSP gap analysis, as well as on the basis of regional analysis conducted by RASG-AFI and APIRG. These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the national level and the level of SMS implementation by national service providers. They take into consideration organizational culture, policies and procedures within AAC, IPIAAM and those of service providers. These organizational challenges are in line with those listed in the 2023-2025 edition of the GASP.

- Implementation of Cabo Verde SSP. This organizational challenge results from ICAO Annex 19 and in line with the GASP it is defined as a priority for Cabo Verde.
- 2) Continuous improvement and implementation of an effective safety oversight system.
 - 2.1 Since ICAO USOAP CMA 2009, Cabo Verde has actively work towards the resolution of all deficiencies and improvement of the safety oversight system. The score achieved in 2018 from the ICAO ICVM is a result of the State commitment to safety. Nevertheless, as a continuous process, there are still some aspects to improve since the 2018 ICVM and the following actions were identified in order to correct the pending safety deficiencies, with emphasis on ANS area which Cabo Verde received the lowest EI score:
 - a) Increase the number of surveillance activities of air navigation services;
 - b) Increase the capability AAC inspectorate to perform surveillance activities;
 - c) Allocate the necessary resources to achieve the effective implementation of the safety oversight system;
 - d) Effective implementation of the rulemaking process for timely amendment of regulations taking into consideration ICAO provisions and their amendments and notification to ICAO of all existing difference;
 - e) Establishment and implementation of a National runway safety program;
 - f) Improve the processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety (CE-8)
 - g) Effective implementation of an independent accident and incident investigation authority. AIG was the area where Cabo Verde received the lowest EI score (56.34%) during the 2009 ICAO USOAP audit and was therefore placed as a high priority issue to resolve. Many initiatives were taken into account to resolve the deficiencies in this regards, i.e the establishment of IPIAAM, training and qualification of own Investigator, new regulations in line with Annex 13, agreement with BAGAIA, development of policies and procedures related to Accident and incident investigation etc. Nevertheless, the following actions are considered necessary to improve the implementation of an effective independent accident and incident investigation authority:
 - Allocate the necessary resources to achieve the effective implementation of an independent Accident Safety Investigation Authority;
 - Establish an effective system to attract, recruit, train and retain qualified and sufficient technical personnel to support investigation activities;
 - iii. Develop and implement technical training courses to qualify safety investigation staff, whether internal or external, within the scope of signed protocols;
 - iv. Develop and conduct emergency drills to test the readiness of the investigating authority and aviation stakeholders,

^{6.} Eight audit areas pertaining to USOAP, i.e. primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations (LEG), civil aviation organization (ORG); personnel licensing and training (PEL); aircraft operations (OPS); airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); air navigation services (ANS); and aerodromes and ground aids (AGA). The safety audit results can be consulted in https://www.icao.int/safety/pages/usoap-results.aspx

v. Develop and conduct investigation workshops at least once a year.

To address the organizational challenges listed above AAC, IPIAAM and service providers will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO ORG Roadmap, contained in the ICAO *Global Aviation Safety Roadmap* (Doc 10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

6. SECTION 6. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION

Cabo Verde will continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP and measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system, to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the mechanisms presented in the appendix to this plan.

In addition to the above, Cabo Verde will review the NASP every three years or earlier, if required, to keep the identified operational safety risks, organizational challenges and selected SEIs updated and relevant. The Agência de Aviação Civil will periodically review the safety performance of the initiatives listed in the NASP to ensure the achievement of national safety goals. If required, Cabo Verde will seek the support of ICAO WACAF, BAGASOO, industry and other national stakeholders such as IPIAAM to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address national safety issues. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, Cabo Verde will make adjustments to the NASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the NASP accordingly.

Cabo Verde will use the indicators listed in Section 3 of this plan to measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system and monitor each national safety target. A periodic annual safety report will be published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the national safety goals, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs.

In the event that the national safety goals are not met, the root causes will be presented. If Cabo Verde identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures will be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an unscheduled revision of the NASP.

Cabo Verde provide information at the regional level, for reporting to the regional aviation safety group (RASG-AFI).

Any questions regarding the NASP and its initiatives, and further requests for information, may be addressed to the following:

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+2382603430
dgeral@aac.cv
www.aac.cv

7. APPENDIX TO THE NASP

DETAILED SEIS: NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate									
Safety enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity		
SEI-1: Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of CFIT	1. Implement the following CFIT safety actions:								
	a) Ensure aircraft are equipped with terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) in accordance with Annex 6	Implemented	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	High	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities		
	(b) Promote the wider use of TAWS beyond the requirements of Annex 6	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators					
	(c) Issue a Safety advisory to increase adherence to TAWS warning procedures	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators					
	(d) Promote greater awareness of	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA					

approach risks (e) Consider the implementation of Continuous Descent Final Approaches (CDFA)	Q1 2025	ASA	AAC, Air operators, ASA			
(f) Consider the implementation of Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) systems	Implemented	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA			
(g) Ensure the timeliness of updates and accuracy of Electronic Terrain and Obstacle Data (eTOD)	Q4 2024	ASA	AAC, ASA			
(h) Promote the use of GPS-derived position data to feed TAWS	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators			
2. Validate the effectiveness of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmap through the analysis of Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MORs) and Voluntary Occurrence Reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	High	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)

	methodologies)						
	3. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs presented in this roadmap through the analysis of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)* and pilot reports** (apply safety management methodologies)	Continuing process	Air Operators	AAC	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	High	Annual Safety Action Group
	4. Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	High	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
	5.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any, for CFIT	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
	6. Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to CFIT	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators ANSP activities

HRC 2: LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT (LOC-I) Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate Safety enhancement Responsible initiative Action Timeline entity Stakeholders Metrics Priority Monitoring Activity **SEI-2: Mitigate** 1. Implement the contributing following LOC-I factors to LOC-I safety actions: accidents and incidents Q1 to Q2 2023 AAC AAC, Air Operators, Training programmes High a) Require upset Surveillance of operator prevention and (ATO), Pilots' updated with upset prevention and ATO training recovery training in associations activities and recovery all full flight Number/percentage of pilots simulator type completing upset prevention conversion and and recovery training recurrent training Upset occurrence rates in voluntary reporting programmes Stick-shaker activation events b) Consider more in FDA data time devoted to LOC-I occurrence rates training for the pilot monitoring role AAC 2. Validate the Continuing AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM effectiveness of the process Safety Enhancement Annual analysis of the High Initiatives (SEIs) Percentage of occurrences reports by the Safety related to LOC-I presented in this Working Group (GSO) roadmap through the analysis of

Mandatory

Occurrence Reporting (MORs) and Voluntary Occurrence Reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management methodologies)						
3. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs presented in this roadmap through the analysis of Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)* and pilot reports** (apply safety management methodologies)	Continuing process	Air Operators	AAC	Percentage of occurrences related to LOC-I	High	Annual Safety Action Group
4. Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to LOC-I	High	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
5.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any, for LOC-I	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to LOC-I	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
6. Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to LOC-I	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities

HRC 3: MID-AIR COLLISION (MAC) Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate Safety Responsible enhancement Monitoring Activity initiative Action Timeline entity Stakeholders Metrics Priority SEI-3: Mitigate 1. Implement the contributing following MAC factors to MAC safety actions: accidents and incidents a) Establish AAC AAC, Air Operators Implemented guidance and regulations to ensure aircraft are equipped with Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), in accordance with Annex 6 AAC, Air Operators b) Ensure AAC High Continuing Percentage of occurrences Surveillance of adherence to ACAS process related to MAC Air Operators, ANSP activities warning procedures c) Promote the AAC AAC, Air Operators, Continuing improvement of Air ASA process Traffic Control (ATC) systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management AAC d) Promote the Implemented AAC, Air Operators,

ASA

improvement of

s p c d	mplementation of STCA, including	Implemented	ASA	AAC, Air Operators,			
te	STCA suitable for erminal areas) Improve reliability	Q1 2024	ASA	AAC, Air Operators			
a s p d	and consistency of safety nets to provide early and dependable warning, and to reduce nuisance alerts						
ir s p a	g) Consider the mprovement aircraft systems to alert bilots to any non-availability of ransponders and ACAS	Q1 2025	Air Operators,	AAC, Air Operators, ASA			
e s ir p r tt	2. Validate the effectiveness of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmap through the analysis of mandatory occurrence reporting	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to MAC	High	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)

volur occu syste and accic inves safet	PRS) and intary currence reporting ems (VORs) dent/incident estigations (apply the management chodologies)						
effect SEIs this r throu of flig moni and p (appl mana		Continuing process	Air Operators	AAC	Percentage of occurrences related to MAC	High	Annual Safety Action Group
	•	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to MAC	High	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
imple SEIs risk c contr		Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to MAC	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities
conti evalu	tinuous luations of the ormance of the	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to MAC	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities

HRC 4: RUNWAY EXCURSION (RE) Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate Safety enhancement Responsible initiative Action Timeline entity Stakeholders Metrics Priority Monitoring Activity **SEI-4: Mitigate** 1. Implement the following RE contributing safety actions: factors to RE accidents and a) Ensure the establishment and incidents: Q4 2023 AAC AAC, ASA, Air Surveillance of Air implementation of a State runway Percentage of High safety programme and runway operators, Aerodromes occurrences operator, Aerodromes, related to RE ANSP and ATO safety teams b) Promote the establishment of AAC AAC, ASA, Air policy and training on rejected Q1 2024 operators, Aerodromes landings, go-arounds, crosswind and tailwind landings (up to the maximum manufacturerdemonstrated winds) AAC, ASA, Air c) Promote equipage of runway Q4 2024 AAC operators, Aerodromes overrun awareness and alerting systems on aircraft d) Ensure effective and timely AAC, ASA, Air Number of reports reporting of meteorological and AAC aerodrome conditions (e.g. runway Continuing operators, Aerodromes related to the runway surface condition in accordance to progress surface condition the ICAO global reporting format in Annex 14, Volume I, braking action and revised declared distances)

e) Promote the implementation runway end safety area (RESA) f) Ensure that procedures to systematically reduce the rate of unstabilized approaches to	Q4 2023	AAC	AAC, ASA, Air operators, Aerodromes AAC, ASA, Air operators			
z. Validate the effectiveness of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmathrough the analysis of mandate occurrence reporting (MORs) at voluntary occurrence reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management methodologies)	he Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RE	High	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)
3. Validate the effectiveness of SEIs presented in this roadmap through the analysis of flight damonitoring (FDM)* and pilot reports** (apply safety management methodologies)	process	Air Operators	AAC	Percentage of occurrences related to RE	High	Annual Safety Action Group
Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RE	High	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO
5.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any, for RE	r Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RE	medium	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO
6. Conduct continuous evaluation of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RE	medium	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO

HRC 5: RUNWAY INCURSION (RI)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks **Target 1.1**: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate

	Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate									
Safety enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity			
SEI-5: Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents:	Implement the following RI safety actions: Ensure the establishment and implementation of a State runway safety programme and runway safety teams	Q4 2023	AAC	AAC, ASA, Air operators, Aerodromes	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	High	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO			
	b) Promote the establishment of policy, procedures and training that supports situational awareness for controllers, pilots and airside vehicle drivers	Q1 2024	AAC	AAC, ASA, Air operators, Aerodromes						
	d) Ensure the use of standard phraseologies in accordance with applicable State regulations and ICAO provisions (e.g. Doc 9432,	Continuing progress	ASA, Air Operators	AAC, ASA, Air operators, aerodromes						

Manual of Radiotelephony) e) Ensure the identification and publication in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) of hot spots at aerodromes	Implemented	Aerodromes	AAC, ASA, Air operators, Aerodromes			
f) Ensure that suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots are developed and executed	Q2 2023	Aerodromes	AAC, Aerodromes			
2. Validate the effectiveness of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmap through the analysis of mandatory occurrence reporting (MORs) and voluntary occurrence reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	High	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)

methodologies)						
3. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs presented in this roadmap through the analysis of flight data monitoring (FDM)* and pilot reports** (apply safety management methodologies)	Continuing process	Air Operators	AAC	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	High	Annual Safety Action Group
4. Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	High	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO
5.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any, for RI	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	medium	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO
6. Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to RI	medium	Surveillance of Air operator, Aerodromes, ANSP and ATO

HRC 6: PRESENCE OF WILDLIFE (BIRDS AND ANIMALS) ON AND IN THE AERODROME VICINITY

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.2: Decrease the number of safety occurrences associated with Presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity.

rarget 1.2. L	Decrease the numbe	er or salety occu	irrences associati	ea with Presence of w	/ildlife (birds and animals) on an	u in the aei	roaronie vicinity.
Safety enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity
SEI-6: Mitigate contributing factors to Presence of wildlife on and in the aerodrome vicinity	1. Implement the following safety actions: a) Ensure the amendment the of the aerodrome's procedures of wildlife management control b) Ensure training to all personnel involved in wildlife management control	Q2 2023 Q3 2023	ASA	AAC, Aerodrome Operators AAC, Aerodromes	Percentage of personnel training	High	Surveillance of Aerodromes
	2. Conduct a wildlife hazard assessment in the aerodrome and vicinity of the airport. 3. Promote the mutual coordination and communication among aerodrome operator and other	Q3 2023 Continuing process	Aerodromes	AAC, Aerodromes AAC, Aerodromes	Percentage of measures implement Number of coordination meetings between aerodromes and other state entities	High	Surveillance of Aerodromes

state departments regarding land-use planning and development in the vicinity of aerodrome						
4. Implement effective control measures in the aerodrome	Continuing process	Aerodromes	AAC, Aerodromes	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	High	Surveillance of Aerodromes
5. Continuous assessment of the wildlife hazard.	Continuing process	Aerodromes	AAC, Aerodromes	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	medium	Surveillance of Aerodromes activities
6. Promote awareness actions in the population surrounding the aerodromes	Continuing process	IPIAAM	AAC, Aerodromes, IPIAAM	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	medium	Surveillance of Aerodromes activities
7. Validate the effectiveness of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmap through the analysis of mandatory occurrence reporting (MORs) and voluntary occurrence reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management methodologies)	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	High	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)

8. Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	High	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities
9.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities
10. Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Number of occurrences related to presence of wildlife	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities

HRC 7: SEASONAL HAZE Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks Target 1.3 increase the capability of aerodromes to operate under seasonal haze Safety enhancement Responsible Monitoring Activity initiative Action Timeline entity Stakeholders Metrics Priority SEI-7: Adopt AAC 1. Collect data of Q4 2023 AAC, Aerodromes, Number of flights affected medium SSP working group impact of Seasonal measures to ASA, Air Operators (cancelled, deviated, gomeetings around etc) by the seasonal reduce the Haze in operations impact of Surveillance activities haze. Seasonal Haze in 2. Promote the Q4 2025 ASA AAC, Aerodromes, operations implementation of ASA, Air Operators adequate measures to mitigate the impact of seasonal haze, as applicable

HRC 8: TERRAIN INFRINGING THE OBSTACLE LIMITATION SURFACES (OLS)

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate

	Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate											
Safety enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity					
SEI-8: Adopt measures to reduce the impact of terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	1) Ensure aircraft are equipped with terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) in accordance with Annex 6	Implemented	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA	Percentage of occurrences related to terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, ANSP activities					
	2) Issue a Safety advisory to increase adherence to TAWS warning procedures	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators								
	3) Promote greater awareness of approach risks	Q2 to Q4 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators								
	4) Consider the implementation of minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) systems	Implemented	AAC	AAC, Air operators, ASA								
	5) Ensure the timeliness of updates and accuracy of Electronic Terrain	Q4 2024	ASA	AAC, Air operators, ASA								

and Obstacle Data (eTOD)						
5. Validate the effectiveness of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) presented in this roadmap through the analysis of mandatory occurrence reporting (MORs) and voluntary occurrence reporting systems (VORs) and accident/incident investigations (apply safety management methodologies)	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	medium	Annual analysis of the reports by the Safety Working Group (GSO)
6. Identify additional contributing factors	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities
7.Develop and implement further SEIs to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors, if any	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities
8. Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEIs	Continuing process	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, IPIAAM	Percentage of occurrences related to terrain in the obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)	medium	Surveillance of Air Operators, Aerodromes, ANSP activities

DETAILED SEIS: ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

Organizational challenge 1: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM

Goal 2: Strengthen the safety oversight capabilities

Target 2.1 By 2025, reach an effective implementation (EI) of the critical elements (CEs) of the Cabo Verde safety oversight system score of 85%.

Safety			,	,	o case verae carety evereignic	,	
enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity
SEI-9:Continuos improvement of the safety oversight system	1) Increase the number of surveillance activities of air navigation services: a) Update ANS Surveillance Program to Increase the number of surveillance activities of air navigation services; b) Allocate the necessary resources to implement the Surveillance plan c) Ensure implementation of the Surveillance plan	Q1 2023 Q1 2023	AAC		Percentage of EI Percentage of PPQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF) Percentage of surveillance plan accomplished	High	USOAP CMA ICAO OLF Quarterly review meetings
	2. Increase the capability AAC inspectorate to perform						

in qualified technical personnel and training requirements necessary to implement the oversight mandate b) Establish human resource plans to support hiring and retention of the appropriate number of qualified technical personnel required c) Ensure resources	Q3 2023 Q4 2023	AAC		•	Percentage of PPQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF) Percentage of training plan accomplished Number of technical personnel hired		ICAO OLF
to implement hiring and training plans 3. Improve the processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies	Q2 2024	AAC	AAC, Air operators, Aerodromes, ASA, ATO, AMO			High	USOAP CMA ICAO OLF
impacting aviation safety (CE-8) a) update processes and procedures related to resolution of safety deficiencies, including the enforcement policy							

	inspectors on the new processes and procedures						
SEI 10: Allocate the necessary resources to achieve the effective implementation of the safety oversight system	1) Review the process for the resource planning and allocation in alignment with the current authority's organizational structure and current challenges, which is required to conduct effective safety oversight	Q3 2023	AAC	•	Percentage of EI Percentage of PPQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF) Percentage of surveillance plans accomplished	High	USOAP CMA ICAO OLF
	2) Obtain a sustainable and stable source of financing through commitments from the national and agency leadership and other stakeholders (CE-1 to CE-3).	Q3 2024	AAC				
	3) Develop a process for assessing changing resource requirements and sustain necessary coordination with resource stakeholders for safety oversight	Q4 2024	AAC				

	improvements						
SEI 11: Effective implementation of the rulemaking process for timely amendment of regulations taking into consideration ICAO provisions and their amendments and notification to ICAO of all existing difference;	1) Do the gap analysis of all ICAO amendments not incorporated in Cabo Verde regulations 2) Ensure implementation of the rulemaking process 3) Notification to ICAO of all differences and publication of differences in AIP	Q1 2023 2023-2025 2023-2025	AAC		Percentage of EI Percentage of PPQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF) Percentage of ICAO ANNEXES compliance checklist/EFOD completed	High	USOAP CMA ICAO OLF
SEI 12: Effective implementation of an independent Accident and Incident Investigation Authority	1) Allocate the necessary resources to achieve the effective implementation of an independent Accident Safety Investigation Authority;	Q1 2023 to Q4 2025	IPIAAM	 IPIAAM CAA Aviation Stakeholders. BAGAIA 	Percentage of EI Percentage of PQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	High	USOAP/CMA results following next audit ICAO OLF
	2) Establish an effective system to attract, recruit, train and retain qualified and sufficient technical personnel to support investigation activities;	Q1 2023 to Q4 2025	IPIAAM	 IPIAAM Aviation Stakeholders. BAGAIA 	Percentage of EI Percentage of PQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	High	USOAP/CMA results following next audit ICAO OLF

3) Develop and implement technical training courses to qualify safety investigation staff, whether internal or external, within the scope of signed protocols;	Q1 2023 to Q4 2025	IPIAAM	 IPIAAM Aviation Stakeholders. BAGAIA 	Percentage of EI Percentage of PQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	High	USOAP/CMA results following next audit ICAO OLF
4) Develop and conduct emergency drills to test the readiness of the investigating authority and aviation stakeholders	Q1 2023 to Q4 2025	IPIAAM	IPIAAM Aviation Stakeholders. BAGAIA	Percentage of EI Percentage of PQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	High	USOAP/CMA results following next audit ICAO OLF
5) Develop and conduct investigation workshops at least once a year.	2023 to 2025	IPIAAM	IPIAAMAviation Stakeholders.BAGAIA	Percentage of EI Percentage of PQ implemented Percentage of required corrective action plans (CAPs) submitted to ICAO (using OLF)	High	USOAP/CMA results following next audit ICAO OLF

Organizational challenge 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF CABO VERDE SAFETY PROGRAM (SSP)

Goal 3: Implement an effective State safety program.

Target 3.1 By 2023 implement the foundation of an SSP

Target 3.2 By 2023 publish a national aviation safety plan (NASP)

Target 3.3 Cabo Verde to work towards an effective SSP as follows: a) By 2025 – Have a SSP that is Present

Safety enhancement initiative	Action	Timeline	Responsible entity	Stakeholders	Metrics	Priority	Monitoring Activity
SEI-13: SSP implementation at the national level	1) Update Conduct initial SSP gap analysis (checklist) then the detailed SSP self-assessment 2) Establish an SSP implementation team 3) Update the implementation plan for the SSP 4) Update SMS regulations and guidance for service providers and verify SMS implementation	Q1 2023 Implemented Q1 2023 Q3 2023	SSP implementation Team	AAC, IPIAAM, MTT	Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable Service Providers who have implemented an SMS. Percentage of SSP PQ with Present level of maturity achieved	High	SSP Implementation team and SSP committee meetings SSP foundation tool (iStars)
SEI-14: Strategic allocation of resources to start SSP implementation	1) identify areas where resources are needed and prepare a budget to enable SSP implementation 2) Obtain resources from national and	Q2 2023 Q2 2023	SSP implementation Team	AAC, IPIAAM, MTT	 Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable Service Providers who 	High	SSP Implementation team and SSP committee meetings SSP foundation tool (iStars)

in ort ion	have implemented an SMS. Percentage of SSP PQ with Present level of maturity achieved
Q3 2024	
e	
Q3 2024	
t ii	Q3 2024 d

SEI 15: Strategic	1) Establish and	Q2 2023	SSP	AAC, IPIAAM, MTT,	Percentage of required	Medium	
collaboration	implement a process		implementation	Services	CAPs related to the SSP		
with key aviation	for sharing technical		Team	providers (AOC,	foundation PQs submitted (using OLF)		
stakeholders	guidance, tools and			ATO, ANSP,	Percentage of required		
	safety-critical			Aerodromes,	CAPs related to the SSP		
	information related			AMO), ICAO	foundation PQs completed (using OLF)		
	to SSP (e.g.			WACAF, AFI-	Number of applicable		
	advisory circulars,			RASG,	Service Providers who		
	staff instructions,			BAGASOO	have implemented an SMS.		
	safety performance				Percentage of SSP PQ		
	indicators), in				with Present level of		
	collaboration with				maturity achieved		
	other States, RASG,						
	RSOO, ICAO and/or						
	other stakeholders						
	2) Work with key	Q3 2023					
	aviation	40 2020					
	stakeholders to						
	execute the action						
	plan for						
	implementation						
	3) Work with key	Q3 2024					
	aviation						
	stakeholders on						
	establishing and						
	updating SSP						
	elements						
	4) Establish a	Q4 2024					
	system for the						
	continuous						
	improvement of the						
	SSP, in						
	Collaboration with all						
	key aviation						
	stakeholders						

SEI 16: Continued availability of safety data and safety information to support safety management activities at the national level	1) Develop safety performance measurement methodologies, aligned with the regional safety metrics, using the established safety risk management process 2) Promote safety awareness and the two-way communication, sharing and exchange of safety-relevant information within the State's aviation organizations and encourage sharing of safety information with industry within the State 3) Contribute information on operational safety risks, including SSP	Q4 2024 Q4 2023			Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable Service Providers who have implemented an SMS. Percentage of SSP PQ with Present level of maturity achieved	Medium	
	safety performance indicators, and emerging issues, to the RASG-AFI						
SEI 17: Acquisition of resources to	(1) Identify resources needed to support safety	Q4 2023	SSP implementation Team	AAC, IPIAAM	 Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) 	Medium	SSP committee meetings

increase the proactive use of	intelligence collection and			Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed	
risk modelling	processing,			(using OLF)	
capabilities	advanced data			Number of applicable	
	analysis, risk			Service Providers who have implemented an	
	modelling and			SMS.	
	information-sharing			Percentage of SSP PQ	
	capabilities			with Present level of	
		Q3 2024	AAC	maturity achieved	
	(2) Train technical				
	personnel in risk				
	modelling				
		Continuing	AAC		
	(3) Train (initial or	process			
	recurrent) Civil				
	Aviation Safety				
	Inspector workforce				
	to perform safety				
	oversight of service				
	providers that have				
	implemented SMS				

End

